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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM G. CARVER, doing 
business as CARVER SHEET 
:METAL WORKS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
W. T. DENN, doing business as 
HUBBARD-DENN 
JEWELERS, 




STATEI\fENT OF FACTS 
This action was instituted by plaintiff and appellant 
upon a complaint (Tr. 1), which alleged that the plaintiff 
between certain dates, at the special instance and request 
of the defendant, furnished the material and performed 
the labor in installing a Palmer Evaporative Air Condi-
tioner in defendant's place of business in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, at an agreed price of $850.00 and that said sum had 
not been paid. The answer of the defendant ( Tr. pp. 4 
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and 5) admitted the installation of the Palmer Evapora-
tive Air Conditioner and the non-payment therefor and, 
as an affirmative defense, the defendant set up an implied 
warranty. The plaintiff's reply denied any warranty. 
(Tr. p. 7). This case was tried to the Court who found 
in favor of the defendant on his theory of an implied war-
ranty and plaintiff's motion for a new trial was there-
after denied. 
The evidence In this case shows that Mr. Fred 
Dunn, an employee of the defendant, approached Mr. 
George Maycock and informed him that the defendant 
was interested in the installation of an air conditioner. 
(Tr. p. 54 and 55). Mr. Dunn stated "We are figuring 
on putting an air cooler in and I knew he (l\Ir. George 
Maycock) was in the air cooler business, so I asked him 
if he would come and contact Mr. Denn about it." :Mr. 
Fred Dunn further stated that Mr. George Maycock did 
come to the defendant's place of business and did discuss 
with the defendant this installation. 
Mr. William T. Denn, the defendant in this action, 
also testified to conversations with George Maycock and 
with Mr. Andrew Maycock in which the installation was 
discussed and Mr. Denn further stated that he knew Mr. 
Maycock personally and knew that he was engaged in a 
business which he referred to as the Maycock Engineer-
ing Company. (Tr. pp. 42, 43 and 44). 
Mr. George Maycock, called as a witness for the 
plaintiff, testified in substance that Fred Dunn, an em-
ployee of the defendant, first asked him to come to the 
defendant's place of business to discuss the installation 
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of an air cooling device. That he did so, and, after sev-
eral meetings with the defendant, W. T. Denn and with 
Fred Dunn, they decided upon the installation of a 
Palmer EvnporatiYe Air Conditioner. 1\ir. George May-
cock further testified that W. T. Denn suggested that 
Can·er Sheet :Metal Works be asked to do the installa-
tion. The evidence further reveals that Mr. Jack Goas-
lind, representing the plaintiff, came to the defendant's 
place of business, made certain measurements under the 
direction of George ~laycock and thereafter installed the 
Palmer Evaporative Air Conditioner under instructions 
furnished by George Maycock. (Tr. pp. 39 to 46 and 
pp. 70 to 73.) 
The record also shows that the A. A. Maycock Com-
pany, at the time of the transaction in question, was 
engaged in the heating, ventilating and air conditioning 
business and was the representative of the company that 
manufactured the Palmer Evaporative Air Conditio~er. 
(Tr. pp. 37 and 38.) 
Further, all of the evidence negatives any conversa-
tions, discussions or negotiations of any kind between the 
plaintiff and the defendant other than the actual contract 
of installation. 
STATEl\iENT OF ERRORS 
1. That the Court below erred in granting judgment 
to the defendant and against the plaintiff. 
2. r~rhat the Court below erred in denying plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial. 
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ARGUl\tfENT 
The only question to be determined upon this appeal 
is the proper application of Section 81-1-15, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, and particularly, subdivisions (1) and 
( 4) of this section, to the facts recited above; or, in other 
words, can an installer, who is neither the dealer or the 
manufacturer, of an article, which is described by its 
patent or trade name, be charged with an implied war-
ranty of quality, particularly where there is a complete 
absence of any evidence of reliance by the buyer upon 
the installer. 
All of the cases that we have found involve an action 
between a buyer and a seller, who is either the manufac-
turer or the dealer, and we have found no case dealing 
,,·ith the precise set of facts in the case at bar. However, 
it would seem that those cases dealing with the question 
where it involves the buyer and a seller, who is also the 
dealer, where there is no reliance by the buyer upon the 
seller, should be conclusive of the question involved here. 
The editors of American Law Reports, Annotated, 
at 59 A. L. R. 1180, make the following introductory 
remarks to the annotation of this problem contained 
there: 
''The raising of an implied warranty of fit-
ness depends upon whether the buyer informed 
the seJler of the circumstances and conditions 
which necessitated his purchase of a certain gen-
eral character of article, and left it to the seller to 
select the particular kind and quality of article 
suitable for the buyer's use. And this is true with-
out reference to whether the rules of the common 
law or the Uniform Sales Act apply, except that 
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under the latter act a dealer is placed under the 
same responsibility as a manufacturer, and the 
term 'trademark' or 'tradename' is employed, 
rather than the term, 'specific, described article.' 
Under either rule the major question, in determin-
ing the existence of an implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose, is the reliance by the 
buyer upon the skill and judgment of the seller 
to select an article suitable for his needs, and the 
question as to whether the article was described 
by its tra.dename or trademark is not conclusive, 
if the other conditions exist which would raise an 
implied warranty of this character." 
And at 59 A. L. R. 1192, in this same annotation, the 
editors make the following remarks: 
''The question whether the buyer relied upon 
the skill and judgment of the seller is also in-
volved in more or less confusion. According to 
the great weight of authority the facts must be 
such as to indicate the selection of the article by 
the seller, or there must be something tantamount 
to a selection of the article by him, rather than by 
the buyer, in order for the case to come within 
the rule relative to an implied warranty of fitness. 
vVhile it would not be practical to attempt to indi-
cate the particular facts which might be sufficient 
to show a selection by the seller, or a reliance by 
the buyer upon the skill and judgment of the 
seller, and the latter's assumption of a superior 
knowledge or skill, it seems clear tl1at the n1ere 
fact of knowledge by the seller of the purpose for 
which the buyer desired the article is not sufficient, 
nor will evidence of representations by the seller 
relative to the desirable qualities of the article, 
amounting to no more than trade talk, be sufficient 
to show a reliance by the buyer upon the skill and 
knowledge of the seller.'' 
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And, continuing at 59 A. L. R. 1197, there Is the 
following general statement: 
''Where the buyer selects some article by its 
tradename or trademark as suitable for his par-
ticular purpose or needs, there is no implied war-
ranty that the article will be fit for this particular 
purpose, or suitable for the peculiar needs of the 
buyer, even though he has communicated to the 
seller his particular use for or need of the article, 
or the seller has otherwise obtained information 
in this respect. ' ' 
And in support of this statement, cases from numerous 
jurisdiction are cited on the two pages following this 
quotation in A. L. R. 
There seem to be only two Utah cases dealing with 
the questions involved here. The first is the case of 
Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 10 P. (2nd) 389. 
This case dealt with the sale of a second hand Gleaner 
harvester with a Fordson engine and in a suit to recover 
the purchase price the defendant pleaded a breach of an 
implied warranty. The court found a nonwarranty clause 
in the contract precluded any implied warranty but went 
on to say: ''Moreover, there is no warranty of fitness 
where the buyer orders a specific article for a specific 
purpose known to the seller." 
The second Utah case is Battle Creek Bread Wrap-
ping Machine Co. v. Paramount Baking Co., 88 Utah 67, 
39 P. (2d) 323. This action was brought in replevin to 
recover certain machinery and the defense was a breach 
of an implied warranty of quality. The court made the 
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following statement, after finding that the contract of 
sale contained a written guarantee as to performance: 
"The fact that an article has a trade name 
does not negative an implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose, where it is purchased, 
not by name, but for a particular purpose and 
supplied for that purpose. In the present con-
tract, the machine was ordered by the name of 
'Duplex Wrapping ~lachine.' I-Iad the contract 
remained silent as to warranties, there would have 
been some justification for the conclusion that it 
was a purchase of a specified known article.'' 
A good statement of the law applicable to these situ-
ations is found in the case of Oil Well Supply Co. v. 
Watson, 168 Ind. 603, 80 N.E. 137, 15 L.R.A. (X.S.) 868, 
59 A.L.R. 1181, where the court said: 
''There are but few subjects of the law that 
appear, upon a. cursory examination of the author-
ities, to be in such a hopeless state of confusion as 
that which relates to what constitutes proper ex-
ceptions to the rule of caveat emptor. A closer 
study, however, will reveal that the apparant . 
disagreement is largely the result of unguarded 
language employed by judges and writers not in 
sympathy with the harshne~s and apparent incon-
gruities of the old rule; and while there has been 
much breaking away from the ancient maxim, and 
considerable difference in the paths chosen, yet the 
ostensible conflict is due quite as much to the dif-
ference in the facts of particular cases as to the 
doctrine applied. 'The maxim of "caveat emp-
tor",' says Mr. Story, 'seems gradually to be re-
stricted in its operation and limited in its domain, 
and beset with the circumvallations of the modern 
doctrine of implied warranty, until it can no longer 
claim the empire over the law of sales, and is but 
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a shadow of itself.' Story, Sales, 4th ed. Page 359. 
It may be said, however, that when chattels are 
sold generally for all purposes to which they are 
adapted, and the seller is not the manufacturer 
or producer, and the property is in existence and 
may be inspected by the buyer, and there is no 
fraud on the part of the seller, the maxim 'caveat 
emptor' applies, even though defects exist in the 
goods which are not discoverable on examination. 
The doctrine of caveat emptor rests upon the 
principle that the purchaser sees, or may see and 
know, what he buys; and, not demanding an ex-
press warranty, it will be conclusively held that 
he was content to rely upon his own judgment; 
and if the goods prove inferior in quality, the pur-· 
chaser has no remedy, but must bear the loss 
himself.'' 
And again in Iron Fireman Coal Stoker Co. v. Brown 
(1931), 182 Minn. 399, 234 N.W. 685, the court says: 
''The spirit and intent of subd. 4 of the stat-
ute is that the seller is not held to an implied war-
ranty because the buyer gets the distinct thing 
selected by him, an exact article, for which he 
bargains. So, acting upon his own desires, he takes 
his own chances as to the fitness of the article, and 
should not be permitted to complain of the seller 
who has supplied him with the very thing he 
sought. B. B. Sturtevant Co. v. LeJ\fars Gas Co. 
(1920), 188 Iowa 584, 176 N. W. 338. In such 
cases it is not important that the buyer discloses 
to the seller his intentions as to the use of the 
article. It is usually helpful to determine upon 
whose judgment and responsibility the purchase 
was made. Or, to state it another way, if the thing 
is itself specifically selected and ordered, the buyer 
takes upon himself the risk of its effecting the 
desired purpose. Under such circumstances, the 
la\v does not impose an implied \\Tarranty; nor 
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should it. The situation is quite different where 
the buyer yields to the trade talk of a salesman 
who sells him something that is wholly unknown 
to him. Perhaps it might be said that, where 
the buyer selects the article, subd. 4 applies, and, 
where the seller selects the article suitable for the 
purpose needed, subd. 1, hereinafter mentioned, 
applies. "\Ve are of the opinion that, where the 
buyer fully informs the seller of his particular 
needs, and the seller undertakes to select or sup-
ply an article suitable for the purpose involved, 
subd. 1 applies even though the article may be 
described in the contract of sale by its trade-
name * * * These are authorities that seem to 
put a strict construction upon this provision of 
the Uniform Sales Act, and hold that, if the con-
tract describes an article by the tradename, there 
is no implied warranty, but such authorities ap-
parently involve cases where the contract discloses 
the article sold under a tradename and the record 
fails to disclose any circumstances such as are 
involved in this case. It would seem that such a 
contract, in the absence of evidence of circum-
stances to the contrary, should be construed under 
the statute as if the purchaser had selected the 
article purchased.'' 
In the case of Dunn Road l\!l:achinery Co. v. Charle-
voix Abstract & Engineering Co., 247 1\Iich. 398, 225 N.vV. 
592, 64 A.L.R. 947, the Court quotes with approval from 
2 Mechem, Sales, Section 1349, as follows : 
''The implied warranty of fitness is not to be 
extended to cases which lack the necessary condi-
tions upon which it depends. The essence of the 
rule is, that the contract is executory; that the 
particular article is not designated by the buyer; 
that only his need is known; that he does not un-
dertake or is not able to determine what will best 
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supply his need and therefore necessarily leaves 
the seller to make the determination and take the 
risk; and if these elements are wanting, the rule 
does not apply. If a known, described and defined 
article is agreed upon and that known, described 
or defined article is furnished, there is no implied 
warranty of fitness, even though the seller is the 
manufacturer ,and the buyer disclosed to him the 
purpose for which the article was purchased.'' 
And this same section is again quoted with approval in 
another Michigan Case, Sibley Lumber Co. v. Schultz, 
297 N.W. 243. 
The following cases are also cited as holding that 
there can be no implied warranty that the article will suit 
the particular needs of the buyer where it is selected by 
its tradename or trademark; even though the buyer has 
communicated to the seller his particular use for or need 
of the article, or the seller has otherwise obtained infor-
mation in this respect : 
Generall\iotors Acceptance Corp. v. Jerry, 
181 Ark. 771, 27S.W. (2d) 997; 
Oil \Vell Supply Co. v. Hopper, 129 I{an. 300, 
282 Pac. 701 ; 
Henderson v. United States Sheet & Window Glass 
Co., 168 La. 66, 121 So. 576; 
May Oil Burner Corp. v. :Munger, 159 Md. 605, 
152 A. 352; 
Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass. 501, 170 N.E. 403; 
Whitty Mfg. Co. v. Clark, 278 Mass. 370, 
180 N.E. 315; 
Damman v. Mercier-Bryan-Larkins Brick Co., 
253 Mich. 392, 235 N. W. 194 ; 
Outhwaite v. A. B. Knowlson Co., 259 Mich. 224, 
242 N.W. 895; 
10 
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Tinius Olsen Testing :Mach. Co., v. Wolf Co., 
~97 Pa. 153, 146 A. 541; 
~Iadison-I~ipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 
311 Pa. ~:2, 166 A. 377 ; 
Russell Grader :Mfg. Co. v. Budden, 197 Wis. 615, 
:2~:2 N.W. 788; 
~Iallow v. Hill, 290 \Vis. 426, 245 N.W. 90. 
vV e again call attention to the testimony contained 
in the record. ~ir. George :Maycock, an employee of A. A. 
~Iaycock Company, a firm handling air cooling equipment 
meets ~Ir. Fred Dunn at a luncheon meeting. Mr. Dunn, 
an employee of the defendant, asks l\fr. :Maycock to call 
upon the defendant as the defendant is desirous of install-
ing such equipment in his store. Some days later Mr. 
:Maycock calls upon the defendant and in due time they 
agree upon the type of equipment to be installed. Thus 
far the plaintiff has not entered into the picture. How-
ever, the defendant, upon learning that the A. A. May-
cock Company does not do the installation work, sug-
gested that the work be done by the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
tendered a bid, which included the type of air cooler 
selected by the defendant and performed the installation 
as outlined by the Maycock Company and as they desired 
it to be done and to their complete satisfaction. The 
plaintiff accordingly was not required to do anything 
except to install the equipment, and, insofar as the testi-
money shows, he did his work properly. 
And, in conclusion, may we emphasize, at the risk 
of repetition, the elements necessary to create an implied 
warranty of fitness where the article is sold by a trad~­
name. First, the article must be selected by the seller 
11 
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and not de signa ted by the buyer. Second, the buyer must 
be shown to have relied on the seller to select the article. 
Third, the buyer's needs must be fully communicated to 
the seller. In the instant case, the record shows that there 
was no discussion between the plaintiff and the defendant 
as to the air conditioner furnished or as to any other 
kind of air conditioning. The plaintiff did not select the 
air conditioner but on the contrary was directed by the 
defendant to install the named air conditioner. And 
finally the record negatives any reliance by the defendant 
on the plaintiff and affirmatively shows that the defen-
dant was placing his reliance upon a third party. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
trial court was erroneous and should be reversed and 
judgment entered for the plaintiff upon his complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. PORTER 
ROBERT B. PORTER, JR. 
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